All checks were successful
Blockers - Cap the rendered output at 64 KiB. Block prefixes are re-emitted on every line, so nesting multiplied against line count: one message at the server's own 1 MB limit rendered to 125 MB and 894 MiB of allocation, which OOM-kills the process in any modest container. Now 65 KB and 30 MiB, with a "…" so a cut message says so. - Stop turning an undecodable transfer encoding into a permanent 550. Real mailers emit unpadded base64, and a 550 tells the sender to stop retrying, so mail that main delivered was lost for good. base64 and quoted-printable now degrade to whatever decoded — and to the bytes as they arrived — exactly as the charset path already did. One unreadable part no longer fails a message that has a perfectly good alternative in hand. - Keep the media type mime.ParseMediaType returns alongside its error. A part with "charset=" or an unquoted attachment file name was dropped whole, which delivered an empty notification with a 250 for mail main forwarded, and made the new attachment guard fail open on the malformed forms older MUAs emit. Renderer - Merge two emphasis spans that meet with nothing between them, and drop a marker nested inside itself. Splitting a bolded label across two <b> runs is what every Word and Outlook export does, and it put a literal "**" in front of the reader — the exact thing this feature exists to prevent. - Render code spans and fenced blocks from their text, so escapes stay literal where Markdown makes them literal, and fence past the longest backtick run inside. A sender could otherwise close the fence and have the rest of the message render as live Markdown — a heading or a link inside what the reader trusts as a forwarded notification. - Strip line breaks from href and src and collapse them in alt text. A newline in a URL is invisible in the document and a fabricated line in the message, and it destroyed the destination as well. - Keep the blank lines inside <pre>, which a diff and a stack trace are shaped by; recognise visibility:hidden, mso-hide:all and font-size:0 preheaders; de-duplicate a bare URL label on a line that opens with a bullet. - Raise the depth guard above the parser's own limit on open elements, so content is never dropped silently between the two. Elsewhere - Forward the raw HTML when a body renders to nothing, as the render-error path already did. An image-only newsletter handed shoutrrr "", which Mattermost and Discord reject, so every target failed and the sender retried forever. - Scope body selection to its container per RFC 2046: the parts of a multipart/alternative are one content in several forms, the parts of any other multipart are cumulative. "Plain beats HTML" applied across a mixed container picked a list's unsubscribe footer over the newsletter itself. - Pass the message by pointer. Its body is a single-use stream cached on the value, so a copy would forward an empty notification to every recipient after the first. - Normalize in BodyFormat.valid(), so a Config assembled in Go rather than loaded from a file does not fail on a Format nobody set. Tests and docs - A realistic transactional message pinned end to end in both formats. Every fault above lived in a combination of features rather than in one of them, which is why statement coverage did not catch any of them. - TestRenderHTMLSurvivesBrokenMarkup asserts output rather than only err == nil, and the nesting-limit test asserts the cap rather than NotContains, which passed on empty output. - README: the conversion section is its own, the startup rejection and the case-insensitivity are documented, the copy-paste example no longer enables a non-default, and "exactly as it arrived" is corrected — raw is decoded first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
331 lines
9.7 KiB
Go
331 lines
9.7 KiB
Go
package smtp2shoutrrr
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net/mail"
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"net/url"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"github.com/containrrr/shoutrrr"
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"github.com/emersion/go-sasl"
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"github.com/emersion/go-smtp"
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)
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// errNoUsableTargets marks a configuration fault rather than a delivery one:
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// the recipient matched, but there is nothing to notify. No retry can add
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// targets to a configuration.
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var errNoUsableTargets = errors.New("recipient has no usable targets")
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var (
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// errUnreadableMessage rejects a message for good. Both causes — a
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// message that is not parseable as mail, and a Content-Type this server
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// cannot make sense of — fail identically on every redelivery.
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errUnreadableMessage = &smtp.SMTPError{
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Code: 550,
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EnhancedCode: smtp.EnhancedCode{5, 6, 0},
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Message: "Message could not be parsed",
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}
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// errMisconfiguredRecipient is permanent for the same reason: the server
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// has nowhere to send this recipient's mail until its configuration
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// changes, which no amount of redelivery brings about.
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errMisconfiguredRecipient = &smtp.SMTPError{
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Code: 550,
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EnhancedCode: smtp.EnhancedCode{5, 3, 5},
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Message: "Recipient has no notification targets configured",
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}
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// errForwardingFailed asks the sender to try again later. The 250 this
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// replaces told the client a message had been delivered when no target
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// had received it, so the client dropped a notification nobody ever saw.
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errForwardingFailed = &smtp.SMTPError{
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Code: 451,
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EnhancedCode: smtp.EnhancedCode{4, 3, 0},
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Message: "Failed to forward message to notification targets",
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}
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)
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type Backend struct {
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config *Config
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}
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func (bkd *Backend) sendNotifications(recipient ConfigRecipient, email *ReceivedEmail) error {
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// Get all target URLs (handles merging and caching)
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targetURLs := recipient.GetTargetURLs()
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if len(targetURLs) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errNoUsableTargets,
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strings.Join(recipient.Addresses, ","))
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}
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// Prepare email body once (reuse for all targets)
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body, err := email.FormattedBody(recipient.Format)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("Error getting email body", slog.String("err", err.Error()))
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to get email body: %w", err)
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}
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slog.Debug("Prepared email body",
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slog.Int("body_length", len(body)),
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slog.String("format", string(recipient.Format)),
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slog.String("subject", email.Msg.Header.Get("Subject")),
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slog.String("content_type", email.Msg.Header.Get("Content-Type")))
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urlParams := url.Values{
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"title": {email.Msg.Header.Get("Subject")},
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}
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// Send to all targets, collect errors
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var errs []error
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for i, targetURL := range targetURLs {
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// Clone URL to avoid mutation
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destinationURL := *targetURL
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// Merge new params with existing query params
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existingParams := destinationURL.Query()
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for key, values := range urlParams {
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for _, value := range values {
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existingParams.Add(key, value)
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}
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}
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destinationURL.RawQuery = existingParams.Encode()
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if err := shoutrrr.Send(destinationURL.String(), body); err != nil {
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slog.Error("Error sending message to target",
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slog.Int("target_index", i),
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slog.String("target", targetURL.Host),
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slog.String("err", err.Error()))
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("target %d: %w", i, err))
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// Continue to next target even if this one fails
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} else {
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slog.Info("Successfully sent notification",
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slog.String("target", targetURL.Host),
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slog.String("recipient", strings.Join(recipient.Addresses, ",")))
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}
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}
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// Only a total failure is reported to the sender. A retry redelivers to
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// every target, so pushing back on a partial one would duplicate the
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// notification on the targets that already accepted it.
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if len(errs) == len(targetURLs) {
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return fmt.Errorf("no target accepted the notification: %w", errors.Join(errs...))
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}
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if len(errs) > 0 {
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slog.Warn("notification reached only some targets",
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slog.Int("failed", len(errs)),
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slog.Int("targets", len(targetURLs)),
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slog.String("recipient", strings.Join(recipient.Addresses, ",")))
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (bkd *Backend) NewSession(c *smtp.Conn) (smtp.Session, error) {
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return &Session{
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forwarderFunc: bkd.forwardEmail,
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config: bkd.config,
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}, nil
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}
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func (bkd *Backend) forwardEmail(email *ReceivedEmail) error {
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slog.Info("forwading message", slog.String("to", strings.Join(email.Recipients, ",")))
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// Try to match configured recipients first
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matched := false
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for _, r := range bkd.config.Recipients {
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for _, a := range email.Recipients {
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if slices.Contains(r.Addresses, a) {
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if err := bkd.sendNotifications(r, email); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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matched = true
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break
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}
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}
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if matched {
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break
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}
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}
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// If no recipient matched and catch-all is configured, use it
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if !matched && bkd.config.CatchAll != nil {
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slog.Info("using catch-all recipient for unmatched email")
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if err := bkd.sendNotifications(*bkd.config.CatchAll, email); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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type Session struct {
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// mu guards the transaction state below. go-smtp runs Data on its own
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// goroutine for a BDAT transfer and keeps serving commands on the
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// connection goroutine meanwhile, so an RSET can land in the middle of
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// one and reset the session from under it.
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mu sync.Mutex
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addresses []string
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// authenticated gates the mail transaction. go-smtp advertises AUTH but
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// never enforces it — that is the backend's job — so without this the
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// server relays for anyone who can open a connection.
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authenticated bool
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config *Config
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// forwarderFunc takes the message by pointer: the body is read from a
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// single-use stream and cached on it, so a copy would forward an empty
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// notification to every recipient after the first.
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forwarderFunc func(*ReceivedEmail) error
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}
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func (s *Session) isAuthenticated() bool {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return s.authenticated
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}
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// recipients copies the transaction's recipients so a concurrent Reset cannot
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// empty the slice a forward in progress is still reading.
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func (s *Session) recipients() []string {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return slices.Clone(s.addresses)
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}
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func (s *Session) AuthMechanisms() []string {
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return []string{sasl.Plain}
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}
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func (s *Session) Auth(mech string) (sasl.Server, error) {
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if mech != sasl.Plain {
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return nil, smtp.ErrAuthUnknownMechanism
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}
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return sasl.NewPlainServer(func(identity, username, password string) error {
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// PLAIN carries an authorization identity distinct from the
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// authenticating one (RFC 4616). There is nobody to act on behalf of
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// here, so only the empty and self-referential forms are accepted.
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if identity != "" && identity != username {
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return smtp.ErrAuthFailed
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}
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// Both comparisons run before either is acted on: short-circuiting on
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// the username would time-distinguish a wrong username from a right
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// one with a wrong password, handing an attacker the username.
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usernameMatches := credentialMatches(username, s.config.Username)
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passwordMatches := credentialMatches(password, s.config.Password)
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if !usernameMatches || !passwordMatches {
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// Logged without the attempted values: a misconfigured client
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// sends its password in the username field often enough that
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// recording them turns the log into a credential store.
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slog.Warn("rejected authentication attempt")
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return smtp.ErrAuthFailed
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}
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.authenticated = true
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s.mu.Unlock()
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return nil
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}), nil
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}
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// credentialMatches compares a supplied credential against the configured one
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// in time independent of how much of it is right. Both sides are hashed first
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// because subtle.ConstantTimeCompare returns early when the lengths differ,
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// which would still leak the length of the configured credential.
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func credentialMatches(supplied, configured string) bool {
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suppliedSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(supplied))
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configuredSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(configured))
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return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(suppliedSum[:], configuredSum[:]) == 1
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}
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func (s *Session) Mail(from string, opts *smtp.MailOptions) error {
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if !s.isAuthenticated() {
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return smtp.ErrAuthRequired
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}
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slog.Debug("Mail from", slog.String("from", from))
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Session) Rcpt(to string, opts *smtp.RcptOptions) error {
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if !s.isAuthenticated() {
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return smtp.ErrAuthRequired
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}
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slog.Debug("Rcpt to", slog.String("to", to))
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.addresses = append(s.addresses, to)
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Session) Data(r io.Reader) error {
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if !s.isAuthenticated() {
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return smtp.ErrAuthRequired
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}
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// Taken before the message is read: an RSET arriving mid-transfer aborts
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// the read, and this is the transaction the recipients belong to either
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// way.
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recipients := s.recipients()
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msg, err := mail.ReadMessage(r)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("Error reading data", slog.String("err", err.Error()))
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return errUnreadableMessage
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}
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slog.Info("Received email", slog.String("destination", strings.Join(recipients, ",")))
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if err := s.forwarderFunc(&ReceivedEmail{
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Recipients: recipients,
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Msg: msg,
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}); err != nil {
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slog.Error("Error forwarding email", slog.String("err", err.Error()))
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, errMalformedMessage):
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return errUnreadableMessage
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case errors.Is(err, errNoUsableTargets):
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return errMisconfiguredRecipient
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default:
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return errForwardingFailed
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Reset ends the current mail transaction. go-smtp calls it after every
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// message, so the recipients have to go: leaving them would forward the next
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// message on the connection to the previous one's targets as well.
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// Authentication deliberately survives, as RFC 5321 scopes RSET to the
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// transaction.
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func (s *Session) Reset() {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.addresses = nil
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}
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func (s *Session) Logout() error {
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return nil
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}
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